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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a sit-
uation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party
(the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for
this notion of transferable control builds on the distinction between formal and
real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole (1997), in which the actual ex-
ercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal
control rights are vacuous. We then use this notion to study the extent to which
control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability
or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the
distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence
how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent
can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication
and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transfer-
able but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally
and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control.
1 Introduction
Much progress has been accomplished in the last fifteen years in modelling control
allocation and in using this notion to analyze vertical and lateral integration,1
financing decisions,2 and the allocation of authority within firms.3 In all these
models, although actions may not be contractible (either ex ante, or both ex ante
and ex post), the allocation of control is. However, this assumption is not always
warranted. For example:
• The President of a country like France cannot contractually commit not
to change (that is, withdraw control from) his/her Prime Minister: Even
if reputation considerations make it credible that he/she will not fire the
new Prime Minister right after having appointed him/her, this obviously
changes subsequently depending on the Prime Minister’s performance on
the job..
• More generally, the promotion/demotion of a subordinate in an organization
(that is, the withdrawing/granting of control for a given set of tasks) rarely
involves prior contractual commitment, but instead relies on (often soft)
information about job performance.
• As for the provision of new credit lines by banks or credit card compa-
nies, there is also typically no contractual commitment for these lines to be
maintained, as banks want to protect themselves against possible abuses by
customers; at the same time, credit lines will not be withdrawn right after
having been granted, and control over the future course of action lies with
the customer until the credit line is removed.
All these examples have the following two features in common: (i) control
is clearly not fully contractible ex ante, but can be transferred somewhat irre-
versibly, at least in the short run when the party doing so finds it in his/her
interest ; (ii) putting a party “in control” allows the other party to test and learn
1See for example Grossman and Hart (1986) Hart and Moore (1990) and more generally
Hart (1995).
2See for example Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994), Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994).
3See for example Aghion and Tirole (1997), Dessein (2000, 2002), Hart and Moore (1999b)
and Hart-Holmström (2002).
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more about the agent’s ability or loyalty to the organization. In this paper, we
therefore explore the implications of transferable control, defined as a situation
where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the
agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this
notion of transferable control builds on the distinction between formal and real
authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole (1997), in which the actual exercise
of authority may require certain critical information, absent which formal control
rights are vacuous;4 and while formal control rights could be contracted upon,
information transfers may not (if for instance the informed party claims that she
has no useful information, or provides useless information, when she does not
consider the information transfer to be in her interest).
In this paper, we use this notion to study the extent to which control trans-
fers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his willingness to co-
operate with the principal. We show that the distinction between contractible
and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with
contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through
revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent con-
trol allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it
can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way
in which the agent exercises this control.
To position the notion of transferable control within the contract theory lit-
erature, it is convenient to refer to the degree of contractibility of actions. More
specifically, consider the following polar cases:
(i) At one extreme, a world with fully contractible actions: contracts can
then fully determine the entire interaction between the parties; this case encom-
passes the implementation literature à la Maskin (1999) or Moore-Repullo (1988),
where one can contract on entire game forms. In such a world, who “chooses” the
action is irrelevant: the contracting parties can limit themselves to sending (pos-
sibly sequential) messages to a “planner” who then takes or dictates all relevant
actions.5
4Alternatively, undertaking an action may require the acquisition of unverifiable skills and
knowledge. The party initially in charge may decide to transfer the required skills (or provide
the adequate training) without being in a position to contractually commit to do so.
5The implementation results of this literature have been generalized by Maskin-Tirole (1999)
to the case where actions are noncontractible “ex ante”, before the revelation of the state of
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(ii) At the other extreme, a world with only noncontractible, pre-assigned
actions: here, contracts hardly affect the structure of the game played by the
parties; this case encompasses both game-theoretic models (such as Kreps et al.
(1982), Sobel (1985) and Watson (1999)), which assume away any contracting,
and moral hazard models (à la Mirrlees (1999), Holmström (1979, 1982), Legros-
Matthews (1993)), where noncontractible actions are pre-assigned to one or the
other party and can only be influenced indirectly, by contracting over related
variables (e.g., output).
In-between, there is partial contracting (see Aghion et al. (2002)), where for-
mal contracts do not determine the entire relation between the contracting par-
ties but can influence the underlying game between them.6 These are situations
in which some actions are ex post nonverifiable and therefore not contractible
ex ante, so that they cannot be delegated to (or dictated by) a social planner.
Yet control over such actions can influence the dynamic interaction between the
parties. Much of the existing literature on control rights and authority has con-
centrated on situations where such control is fully contractible.7
Our paper is first related to the above literature on control rights and author-
ity, to which we add the possibility of credible control transfers. We thus focus
on a case intermediate between contractible control and pre-assigned actions (or
“moral hazard”), where control over particular actions is not contractible but
still credibly transferable. Second, our model also relates to the game-theoretic
literature on reputation; allowing for contracting before the actual game takes
place however allows us to study under which conditions — e.g., contractible ver-
sus transferable control — information is transmitted by action choices rather than
through revelation mechanisms. Third, since we focus on control allocation as
a way to induce cooperation, our analysis also relates to the literature on “for-
mal” versus “informal” contracting, and in particular to Baker et al. (2002) and
Halonen (1997). In a repeated model of ownership allocation à la Grossman-Hart
(1986), where all parties have complete information, Baker et al. (2002) show
nature, but become contractible “ex post”, after the revelation of the state of nature.
6Aghion et al. (2002) discuss the connection between partial contracting and the debate
on the foundations of incomplete contracts (e.g in Segal (1999), Hart-Moore (1999a), Maskin-
Moore (1999), Maskin-Tirole (1999) and Tirole (1999)).
7See e.g. Aghion-Bolton (1992), Dewatripont-Tirole (1994), Aghion-Tirole (1997), Legros-
Newman (1999) and Hart-Moore (1999b). See also Dewatripont (2001).
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that vertical integration may help the parties to hold on to their promises of tak-
ing costly actions or making costly monetary transfers. Based also on a repeated
ownership allocation model, but with imperfect information about the parties’
disutility from cheating on effort or investment commitments, Halonen (1997)
argues that joint ownership may emerge as a desirable contractual outcome ex
ante, because both parties will then find it particularly costly for their reputation
to renege on their promises. This rationale for control allocation is reminiscent
of the argument of Boot et al. (1993), who stress that “loan commitment con-
tracts” that allow banks to unilaterally renege on their commitments imply that
the bank’s reputation for “fairness” is enhanced when they do not actually re-
nege. These papers, however, do not distinguish between contractible control and
transferable control, and they restrict attention to simple contracts, even though
revelation mechanisms would be more effective (for example, in Halonen’s frame-
work, where trade is supposed to be ex post verifiable, relatively simple contracts
could be quite powerful).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework. Section
3 focuses on contractible control and shows that in a broad range of situations the
optimal contract is a revelation mechanism promising control to the agent when
he announces a non-cooperative type. This kind of mechanism ceases to be cred-
ible when control is not contractible but only transferable. In this case, as shown
in Section 4, the power of revelation mechanism is greatly reduced and uncondi-
tional control transfers emerge as an optimal learning device. While Sections 3
and 4 went for simplicity in not allowing for monetary responsiveness, Section 5
shows that our results are robust to its introduction. Finally, Section 6 connects
our analysis to the Aghion-Tirole (1997) concepts of formal and real authority,
briefly discusses its implications for the study of delegation, and suggests some
obvious extensions for future research.
2 Framework
This section outlines an incomplete information framework where control alloca-
tion serves as a natural instrument to enhance trust and cooperation. Specifically,
we consider a relationship between a principal (she) and an agent (he), hereafter
P and A, meant to carry out a project: P has overall control over the project
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but needs A for implementing it. More precisely, the project involves two stages,
design and implementation. In the design stage, the party in charge chooses be-
tween two actions, C and N ; action C is the “cooperative” action that is best for
the project, whereas action N is a “non-cooperative” action that A may favor —
for example, it may enhance A’s human capital or, more generally, A’s market
value. In the implementation stage, P decides whether to implement the project
(I), or to stop it (S). A can be “good” or “bad,” and the project is worth imple-
menting only if A is good. Initially, P does not know A’s type; we denote by µ
her prior probability that A is bad.
Specifically:
• in stage 1, the design decision has to be made; P can either take the decision
or let A take it; we shall distinguish between the case where P and A can
contract over who is in charge of design and the case where P can simply
transfer control to A, without contractually committing herself to do so.
The design decision itself (C or N) is observed by both parties but not
contractible. We normalize to zero the parties’ payoffs from C; adopting
instead the non-cooperative action N does not affect a good A but entails
a loss (−l) for P and a benefit B for a bad A. P ’s and A’s payoffs from N
are thus respectively:8
(−l, 0) when A is good,
(−l, B) when A is bad.
• in stage 2, P freely decides whether to implement or stop the project (ac-
tions I and S respectively): this decision is not contractible and cannot be
delegated to A. Stopping the project yields zero payoffs for both parties.
Implementing the project brings instead an additional gain G to P and g
to A when A is good, while it brings a loss (−L) to P and a gain b to A if
A is bad. P ’s and A’s payoffs from I are thus respectively:
(G, g) when A is good,
(−L, b) when A is bad.
8At the end of Sections 3 and in Section 5, we discuss the robustness of our results with
respect to changes in the payoff matrix.
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We assume away discounting between the two stages; P ’s and A’s overall
payoffs are thus simply the sum of the first- and second-stage payoffs and can be
summarized as follows:
• when A has a good type:
Action I S
C G, g 0, 0
N G− l, g −l, 0
• when A has a bad type:
Action I S
C −L, b 0, 0
N −L− l, B + b −l, B
Figure 1
We shall restrict attention to the case where:
B > b > 0,
L > l > 0.
Thus a good A is willing to cooperate in stage 1 and gains g from P ’s im-
plementing the project; in contrast, a bad A gains B from the non-cooperative
design action N ; he also gains b from the implementation of the project, but
prefers the non-cooperative design action N even if this induces P to stop the
project (B > b). P incurs a loss l from the non-cooperative action at the design
stage and an even bigger loss L from implementing the project when the agent
has a bad type; P is thus willing to let a bad A choose the non-cooperative action
at the design stage to learn his type (and stop the project).
This payoff structure is that of a typical signalling game, where preference
heterogeneity between the two types of A can allow for separation. It is however
particular in one important respect: there is congruence in both periods between
the preferences of P and the good type of A (in particular, both prefer C followed
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by implementation to N followed by stopping the project).9 At the end of Section
3, we discuss the role of this congruence.
If P is uninformed about A’s type when deciding whether to implement or
stop the project in stage 2, she will stop the project (whatever action has been
chosen in stage 1 since utilities are all separable over time) whenever:
(1− µ)G+ µ(−L) < 0;
(the left hand side is the expected stage-2 payoff of the principal if she implements
the project, the right hand side is her stage-2 payoff if she stops the project); this
can be reexpressed as:
µ > µ∗ ≡ G
G+ L
.
Incomplete information thus generates two types of problems: first, when µ is
too large, P prefers to stop the project since she cannot obtain a positive payoff
in stage 2. Second, when µ is small enough, P cooperates (does not stop the
project) but loses L when A is a bad type. We now explore alternative means by
which these two problems can be solved.
We start our analysis by assuming that payoffs are private benefits and that
the parties are not responsive to monetary incentives. Therefore, contracts con-
sist of revelation mechanisms to be played at the beginning of each stage; as a
function of messages sent at the beginning of stage 1, control over project de-
sign is allocated to the agent or kept by the principal, and given the messages
exchanged between the two parties up to stage 2, the principal decides whether
to implement the project. When parties are instead responsive to monetary in-
centives (in Section 5 below), optimal contracts also include message-contingent
transfer payments.
9Fixing the implementation decision, a good A is here indifferent between cooperating or
not on design. The analysis applies unchanged when a good A gains ε from adopting N , where
ε is small but either negative (a good A strictly prefers to cooperate) or positive (a good A is
slightly reluctant to cooperate). What matters is that a good type is willing to cooperate if
this induces P to implement the project (i.e., g > ε).
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3 Contractible control: The power of revelation
mechanisms
In this section we assume that control over stage 1 can be specified by an enforce-
able contract between P and A. The set of feasible strategies and contracts and
the timing of moves can then be described as follows (in the absence of monetary
responsiveness).
In the contracting phase, P offers a contract to A; this contract dictates an
allocation of control over the stage 1 action, possibly contingent upon messages
sent by A at that stage. The agent then decides whether or not to accept this
contract; if he refuses, the game ends and both parties get zero; if he accepts, the
game proceeds as follows:
• In stage 1, A sends messages and control is then (possibly randomly) allo-
cated to P or A according to the contract; whoever ends up in charge of
stage 1 chooses between C and N.
• In stage 2, A may again send messages; P then decides whether or not to
implement the project.
Note however that, without loss of generality, one can restrict attention to
contracts in which the agent sends no message in stage 2. This follows from the
cheap talk nature of the stage 2 message game: a bad A only sees advantages and
no cost in mimicking a good type at stage 2, since doing so can only encourage
P to implement the project, which is good for him. And since P ’s decision to
implement the project or not is not contractible, she will do it if and only if it is
in her interest to do so.
For simplicity, we concentrate below on contracts where pure strategies are
played (and we explain in footnotes how the results are robust to the possibility
of mixed strategies). Two types of contracts are therefore possible:
• Contracts where the agent does not send any message (equivalently, both
types send the same message which is then useless). P can for example sim-
ply choose to keep control over the stage 1 action, and implement the project
in stage 2 if and only if µ < µ∗. P ’s payoff is then max {(1− µ)G− µL, 0}.
Alternatively, P could give control to A and infer A’s type from his choice
of action; we further explore this latter possibility in the following section.
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• Revelation mechanisms, where P learns A’s type through the messages sent
in stage 1 and then implements the project only if A reports a good type.
Intuitively, in such a revelation mechanism a bad A could gain b in stage 2 by
misreporting a good type. To prevent this, P must reward a bad A for revealing
himself, and can do so by giving a bad A control over stage 1. Since a bad A
can obtain B by choosing N , to induce truthtelling P must grant control to a
bad A with at least probability b/B; in addition, in order to minimize a bad
A’s incentive to misreport his type, P should not give control to a good A. The
following proposition confirms this intuition:
Proposition 1 P ’s optimal revelation mechanism, Mc, is such that: (i) P keeps
control in stage 1 when A announces a good type, and (ii) P allocates control to
A with probability b/B when A announces a bad type. In the associated equilib-
rium, action N is chosen if and only if a bad A gets control and the project is
implemented if and only if A announces a good type.10
Proof. In any revealing equilibrium, P implements the project if the agent
reports a good type and stops it otherwise. Thus, a good A is always willing to
report his type, since he gets g by doing so and 0 by behaving as a bad type.
Let x and y denote the probabilities that A obtains control when announcing
a good and a bad type. P will clearly choose action C when she has control over
stage 1. When a good A gets control, he is indifferent between actions C and N
while P benefits from action C. In contrast, a bad A always chooses action N
when in control. Therefore, the best for P is that a good A chooses C whenever
in control: this improves P ’s payoff, and also helps P deterring a bad A from
misreporting a good type. P ’s expected payoff is then given by
(1− µ)G− µyl,
10This result remains valid when equilibrium mixed strategies are considered, which can be
seen as follows: (i) first, if A obtains control in stage 1, he will play a pure strategy for sure,
and so will P in stage 2; (ii) if P is in control in stage 1, she will not mix in stage 2 (between
I and S) if her posterior probability assessment that A is bad is not equal to µ∗. But if P
does not mix in stage 2, she prefers the bad A also not to mix (between saying he is bad or
good), since the loss from I (L) outweighs the loss from stage 1 control (as for the good A, he
never wants to mix, since he is indifferent between C and N , and only cares about the stage 2
action); (iii) finally, an outcome where P is in control in stage 1 and mixes in stage 2 is also
unattractive for P , because it means she obtains a zero payoff upon having stage 1 control (and
a negative one upon not having stage 1 control).
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while the bad A’s incentive compatibility condition for truthtelling is:
yB ≥ (1− x) b+ xB.
Since B > b, the optimal probabilities of control are thus x = 0 and y = b/B.
The mechanism Mc gives P an expected payoff equal to
(1− µ)G− µ b
B
l,
and is thus positive whenever
µ < µc ≡
G
G+
b
B
l
.
The mechanismMc addresses the two problems mentioned above: the revelation
of A’s type allows P to implement the project when — and only when — it is
desirable to do so. However, this revelation has a cost: P must “reward” a bad
type A for telling the truth, namely by granting control to that bad type in stage
1 with probability b/B, in which case action N is implemented instead of action
C.
Note that P prefers Mc over “keeping control with probability 1 and imple-
menting the project”: L > l and B > b imply
(1− µ)G− µ b
B
l > (1− µ)G− µL.
Note moreover that µc < µ
∗, so there are cases (µc < µ < µ
∗) where Mc is prof-
itable even when, if uninformed, P would have chosen to stop the project in stage
2.
Remark: We stressed above that the payoff structure was particular in hav-
ing P ’s preferences congruent with that of a good A. Indeed, the above revelation
mechanism no longer works when the principal’s preferences become sufficiently
non-congruent with those of both types of agents. Suppose for example11 that, at
stage 1, there are three possible actions to be taken: C,N and N 0. The payoffs
from C and N are the same as before, and N 0 brings zero to P and a bad A; but
a good A now gains Bg > 0 from N 0. Therefore, P prefers C to N and N 0, and
a bad A prefers N to C and N 0, but a good A now prefers N 0 to C and N.
11We thank a referee for suggesting this example.
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Let as before x and y denote the probabilities that A obtains control when
announcing a good and a bad type. To induce A to tell the truth, we must have:
• for a good type:
xBg + g ≥ yBg + yg; (1)
• for a bad type:
yB ≥ xB + (1− x)b. (2)
Indeed, if a good A report his type truthfully, in stage 1 he obtains control
with probability x and can then choose his preferred action N 0, while in stage 2
P implements the project; if he reports instead a bad type, with probability y he
gets control and reveals his true type by choosingN 0, inducing P to implement the
project,12 otherwise P chooses C and then stops the project. Similarly, if a bad
A reports his type truthfully he obtains control and chooses N with probability
y, while P stops the project to avoid losses in stage 2; if he pretends instead to
be a good type, with probability x he acquires control and then reveals his type
by choosing N , otherwise the principal keeps control and implements the project.
The two incentive conditions can be rewritten as
(1 + α) (1− y) ≥ 1− x ≥ 1
1− β (1− y) ,
where α = g/Bg and β = b/B. Therefore, if
(1 + α) <
1
1− β ,
both conditions can be simultaneously satisfied only if x = y = 1, which amounts
to simply transferring control to A and learning from his choice of action.
4 Transferable control and learning by delega-
tion
While Mc illustrates how control allocation can be used to induce truth-telling
through a standard revelation mechanism, this contract suffers from obvious cred-
ibility problems: P has no incentives to transfer control to a bad A once his type
12Alternatively, P could stick to the belief that A has a bad type; however, such a belief
would contradict for example Cho and Kreps’ intuitive criterion, since only a good A gains
from choosing N 0, even if doing so is the only way to induce P to implement the project.
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has been revealed. Hence our interest in exploring the case where control is
transferable but noncontractible: in that case, P can choose to transfer control
(given A’s messages) at the beginning of stage 1, but cannot commit to do so
at the contracting stage. The set of strategies and the timing of events are then
modified as follows. In the contracting phase, P offers a contract to A, which
again allows for messages to be sent by A at the beginning of each stage, but can
no longer dictate the allocation of control over the first stage. As before, A then
decides whether or not to accept the contract; if he refuses, the game ends and
both parties get zero; if he accepts, the game proceeds as follows.
• In stage 1, A sends messages; then P decides with full discretion whether or
not to transfer control to A; whoever ends up in charge of stage 1 chooses
between C and N .
• Stage 2 is unchanged: Amay again send messages before P decides whether
or not to implement the project.
We can immediately establish the following lemma:
Lemma 2 When control over stage 1 is transferable but not contractible, there
is no loss of generality in not asking the agent to send messages.
Proof. When control over stage 1 is not contractible, message games involve
cheap talk not only in stage 2 but also in stage 1: in both stages, a bad A sees
only advantages and no cost in reporting a good type. Therefore the principal
may as well ignore any message A might send at any stage.
Given this lemma, at the contracting stage P must simply choose between
keeping control, in which case she remains uninformed about A’s type by the end
of stage 1, or transferring stage 1 control to A. The cost of such a control transfer
is that the bad A will choose action N , which is his dominant strategy. The good
A instead is happy to choose action C, especially since this signals his good type
and ensures that P implements the project.13 In comparison with the case where
P keeps control in stage 1, transferring control to A clearly improves A’s expected
payoff. It also increases P ’s expected payoff whenever the (short-term) loss from
13There may also exist pooling equilibria where both types of agents choose action N . These
equilibria are however dominated by those in which P keeps control over the stage 1 action.
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losing control in stage 1 is more than compensated by the (long-term) benefit of
learning A’s type prior to stage 2.
The stage 1 loss comes from the fact that a bad A chooses action N. The
expected loss for P , who then stops the project in stage 2, is therefore equal to
µl. The stage 2 informational gain now depends upon the equilibrium that would
prevail if A did not signal his type:
• If the probability of a bad type agent is sufficiently small (µ ≤ µ∗), an
uninformed principal P would always implement the project; learning A’s
type then allows P to stop the project and avoid the loss L when A turns
out to be a bad type. Thus, for µ ≤ µ∗ learning A’s type allows P to save
µL in expected terms; P will thus prefer to grant control to A in stage 1
since L > l implies
µL ≥ µl.
• If the probability of a bad type agent is sufficiently high (µ > µ∗), an unin-
formed principal P would instead stop the project; learning A’s type then
allows P to implement the project and gain G if A turns out to be a good
type. Thus, learning A’s type when µ > µ∗ generates an additional ex-
pected gain equal to (1− µ)G to the principal; for such values of µ, P will
thus prefer to grant control to A in stage 1 if:
(1− µ)G > µl,
or equivalently:
µ < µt ≡
G
G+ l
.
This establishes our main result:
Proposition 3 P ’s optimal transferable-control contract,Mt, is such that: (i) no
messages are sent before stage 1 (and a fortiori after that stage); (ii) P transfers
control over the stage 1 action to A if µ < µt and keeps control (and stops the
project in stage 2) otherwise; (iii) if A obtains control in stage 1, he chooses action
C if his type is good and action N otherwise, and P implements the project if
and only if action C has been chosen.14
14Once again, mixed strategies will not alter the result: whatever the equilibrium messages
13
It is therefore in P ’s interest to transfer control to A for small values of µ: if
µ is too high, the hope that a good A will act cooperatively in stage 1 in order
to keep the project going in stage 2 is too small compared with the short-term
loss from a bad A’s non-cooperating in the first stage.
To summarize, when A’s willingness to cooperate is initially unknown by P ,
two problems may potentially arise: either cooperation is impossible in stage 2
(P stops the project), or “excessive” cooperation imposes losses on P . Then,
“testing” A by giving him control over stage 1 creates an opportunity for A to
reveal his willingness to cooperate, which in turn helps overcome each of the above
two problems. By transferring control of stage 1 to A, P may not lose that much
since a good A will want to choose action C to induce the implementation of the
project; furthermore, any early loss induces P to take “appropriate measures”
(that is, to stop the project) to prevent subsequent losses.15
A final remark to conclude this section: by transferring control to A, which
is optimal when µ < µt, P achieves an expected payoff equal to:
(1− µ)G− µl.
This payoff achieved throughMt is lower than what she gets with the contractible-
control revelation mechanism Mc described in the previous section, namely:
(1− µ)G− b
B
µl.
Therefore:
• When control is contractible, it is optimal for P to have A’s type re-
vealed through a direct revelation mechanism rather than through ”trust-
building”; specifically, the relationship is profitable when µ < µc and Mc is
sent by A, the probability that P transfers control cannot be increasing in her probability
assessment that A is bad. On the other hand, it is also impossible that it be strictly decreasing
in equilibrium, because this would violate the bad A’s incentive constraint. Therefore, messages
can be ignored and we are left with unconditional control transfers.
15On the other hand, P must be able to commit to let A exert control over a number of
actions and/or for some time, so as to allow a bad A to gain sufficiently from the exercise of
this control. If for example P had the right to “withdraw” control from A at any moment, then
P would indeed be tempted to overrule A’s choice of N . Anticipating this, a bad A would then
“choose” C to preserve his benefit from implementation and the principal would thus never
learn the agent’s “exercise” of control. More generally, P must be in a position to transfer
control irreversibly for at least some time, for such control to be useful as a learning device.
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then the optimal contract for P , since it induces truth-telling with a smaller
probability (b/B instead of 1) of control allocated to a bad A.
• When control is transferable but not contractible, the relationship is prof-
itable only when
µ < µt =
G
G+ l
,
and Mt is then the optimal contract for P ; control is then transferred with
higher probability (1 instead of b/B) but only for a smaller interval of µ’s
(since µt < µc).
5 Monetary responsiveness
We have so far restricted attention to the case where the contracting parties do
not respond to monetary incentives. But now suppose that P ’s and A’s utilities
are given by:
UP = πP + p and UA = πA − p
where πP and πA denote the private benefits of the two parties (defined as in
the previous section), and p is a monetary transfer from A to P. Since we now
have transferable utilities, what matters for efficiency is the sum of the parties’
payoffs; in keeping with the analysis of the previous sections, we assume in this
section
L > l > B > b,
so that it is efficient to stop the project when the agent is bad.
Allowing for monetary responsiveness means that contracts can require trans-
fers contingent on messages, which in turn can provide additional ways to acquire
the information over A’s type. In particular, if b < g, P can simply keep control
and obtain full revelation at stage 2 by having the good A pay g against project
implementation.16 The possibility of monetary transfers thus eliminates the role
for allocating or transferring control to A in that case. When b > g, however, the
previous insights remain valid, as we show below.
16If b < g, in the absense of any messages there exists a separating equilibrium in which: (i)
P keeps control and chooses C in stage 1 and implements the project in stage 2 only if A pays
p = g; (ii) only a good A makes the payment. In this equilibrium, P implements the project
only when A is good and both types of agent get zero rent.
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5.1 Contractible control
Introducing monetary transfers allows P to extract rents fromA and also to “sell”
stage 1 control. The following proposition extends the previous analysis:
Proposition 4 Assume that b > g. Then, the optimal separating contract for
P consists in selling control at price g with probability (b − g)/(B − g) when A
reports a bad type, while keeping control and requiring a payment of g when A
reports a good type.17 In this mechanism, a good A obtains no rents while a bad
A obtains b− g and P obtains a positive expected payoffs as long as
µ < µmc ≡
1
1 + b−g
B−g
l−g
G+g
.
Proof. See Appendix.
In other words, when b > g the introduction of monetary transfers does
not eliminate the role for (contractible) control allocation; in particular, it can
be checked that, whenever the relationship is profitable (µ < µmc ), P prefers
this separating contract to staying uninformed and keeping control over stage
1. However, the optimal separating contract still allocates control with positive
probability to a bad A and never to a good A; thus, while monetary transfers
allow for a reduction in the probability of control given to a bad A, the optimal
contract still suffers from the same credibility problem as in Section 3.
Remark: As shown in Aghion et al. (2003), allowing for monetary transfers
tends to increase the power of revelation mechanisms: Charging for control allo-
cation reduces a good A’s net gain from acquiring control, and therefore reduces
17Once again, this result is robust to the consideration of mixed strategies. Essentially the
same arguments apply as in footnote 10, since the mechanism is very similar - although with
a different probability of giving control to A - except that there is a price g to be paid by A
whenever he actually receives stage 1 control: (i) first, if A obtains control in stage 1, he will
play a pure strategy for sure, and so will P in stage 2; (ii) if P is in control in stage 1, she will
not mix in stage 2 (between I and S) if her posterior probability assessment that A is bad is
not equal to µ∗. But if P does not mix in stage 2, she prefers the bad (resp. good) A also
not to mix (between saying he is bad or good), because I (resp. S) is inefficient; (iii) finally,
an outcome where P is in control in stage 1 and mixes in stage 2 is also unattractive for P ,
because, on the one hand, it means she does not benefit from the gain of implementation of
the project and, on the other hand, by lowering the probability of implementation, she will
moreover obtain a lower expected payment from the good A (whose participation constraint
is binding) and in turn from the bad A (whose incentive constraint is binding) at the initial
message stage.
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the degree of non-congruence between a good A and P . Yet, we show that these
revelation mechanisms only work if the lack of congruence between the good A’s
preferences and P ’s preferences is not too severe.
5.2 Transferable control
When b > g, a bad type is more eager than a good one to get control over
stage 1 and/or convince P to implement a project; however, P would never
transfer control or implement the project if she learned that A was bad. It is
therefore impossible to have A’s type revealed through type-contingent messages
or payments. In fact we can show:
Lemma 5 Assume b > g. When control over stage 1 is transferable but not
contractible, then payments and control allocation cannot depend on the agent’s
type; there is thus no loss of generality in not asking the agent to send messages.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given this lemma, at the contracting stage P must simply stipulate a price
(which must be the same for both types) and choose between: (i) keeping control,
in which case she remains uninformed about A’s type by the end of stage 1; (ii)
transferring stage-1 control to A. The same analysis as in Section 4 then leads
to:
Proposition 6 Assume b > g. When control over stage one is transferable but
not contractible, the relationship is profitable as long as µ < µt = G/(G + l),
in which case P ’s optimal contract is such that: (i) no messages are sent before
stage one (and a fortiori after that stage); (ii) A pays g and P transfers control
over stage 1 to A; (iii) in stage one, a good A chooses C whereas a bad A chooses
N , and in stage two P implements the project if and only if C has been chosen
in stage one. In comparison with the contractible control optimum, the good A
still gets no rents, the bad A gets higher rents and P gets lower rents. Finally, if
µ ≥ µt, it is optimal for P to keep control and stop the project.18
18Just as without monetary responsiveness, mixed strategies will not alter the result: what-
ever the equilibrium messages sent by A, the probability that P transfers control cannot be
increasing in her probability assessment that A is bad. On the other hand, it is also impossible
that it be strictly decreasing in equilibrium, because this would violate the bad A’s incentive
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Proof. See Appendix.
Introducing monetary transfers thus allows P to extract some of the agent’s
rents (when the relationship is profitable) but does not otherwise affect the opti-
mal contract. Transferring control remains the only way for P to learn A’s type
in stage 1.19
6 Discussion and conclusions
This paper provides contract theoretic foundations for games in which a prin-
cipal needs to transfer control rights to her agent in order to “test” her ability
or propensity to cooperate in the future. Specifically, we have shown that when
control is transferable, as opposed to being contractible, simple control transfers
emerge as optimal learning devices. Thus, moving from contractible to trans-
ferable control can significantly reduce the power of revelation mechanisms: the
principal may no longer rely on communication and message-based control trans-
fers, but simply put the agent in charge and learn from the agent’s exercise of
control.
Taking a contractual perspective moreover generates additional insights for
the theory of organizations. In this section, we discuss two applications of our
framework to, respectively, the transfer of “real” authority and the scope of del-
egation.
6.1 Transferring real authority
Aghion and Tirole (1997) (hereafter AT) stress that the exercise of authority re-
quires more than the formal right to make decisions: it often also requires relevant
information in order to take appropriate decisions. AT investigate this issue in
the context of an investment problem where one project has to be chosen among
n ex-ante indistinguishable projects. Contracting first takes place over formal au-
thority, then effort is exerted by the parties in order to acquire information about
the payoffs of the various investment projects, and finally the investment project
constraint. Moreover, the condition b > g also rules out any separation between types, even a
probabilistic one, using monetary payments. Therefore, we are left with unconditional control
transfers and monetary payments.
19However, when control is contractible, P does better using the revelation mechanism de-
scribed in subsection 5.1, which minimizes the probability of giving control to a bad A.
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can be chosen. Since the parties have partially congruent payoffs, it may be in
the interest of the party endowed with formal authority, when she is uninformed,
to “grant” real authority to the other party, by following his recommendation.
In order to connect AT’s basic setup to our analysis, let us reinterpret stage
1 of our model in the light of the AT framework: label party P ’s favorite project
as “action C”, while A’s favorite project is “action N”. Knowing which actions
are C and N is however not obvious, because they are among n possible actions
that are ex ante indistinguishable. A’s type in our model can be interpreted
as the degree of congruence of A’s payoff function with P ’s payoff function: a
“good type” is congruent with P , while a “bad type” is not. The difference in
information structure between AT and us is that AT assume that both parties
are initially uninformed about project returns but know the degree of congruence
of their payoffs. Here instead, P knows the various project returns, but does not
know the degree of congruence between A’s interest and her own. This matters
because P has to rely on A in stage 2 if she does not stop the project. The
question then is whether P can learn about A’s payoff structure by giving him
(real) authority in stage 1.
Let us first assume that the formal stage-1 decision rights necessarily belong to
A (suppose for example, as in the classical moral hazard literature, that P is either
too busy or unable to actually take the action in that stage). In this case, the
relevant notion of “control” is, who has the information needed to take decision,
that is, who has real authority. And to the extent that the relevant information is
not “verifiable”, this control is not contractible but it is transferable: since A has
formal authority, providing him with the relevant information indeed amounts to
an irreversible transfer of real authority.
To be specific, assume as in AT that, except for C andN , all the other projects
are so bad that choosing at random is worse than doing nothing at all. Since A is
initially uninformed about project returns, he then needs information from P to
make any stage-1 decision. It is natural to assume that, in many instances, P
cannot commit ex ante to transmit the appropriate information.20 On the other
hand, if P informs A about the identity of both “action C” and ”action N”,
20In particular, if contractually instructed to identify x actions for A, P could decide to only
tell A about action C and “bad” actions (possibly identifying several times the same action),
but not action N .
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control is irreversibly transferred to A: once A knows about action N , there is
nothing to prevent him from choosing it, given that he has received formal stage-1
control rights initially.
With this reinterpretation of the stage-1 actions along the lines of the AT
setup, we can now apply straightforwardly the results of the previous section:
provided that the probability µ that A is not congruent enough with P is not
too large, it can become optimal for P to give away (or sell, under monetary
responsiveness) formal authority over the stage-1 action toA, and also to transmit
information to A about which among the n actions are actions C andN . Through
this transfer of control, P has the opportunity to learn about A’s type, and to
stop the project in stage 2 if and only if A has chosen action N in stage 1.
Let us now assume that formal stage-1 decision rights can be contractually
allocated to either P or A. Two cases might then be considered:
• if P can provide A with the relevant information about C and N before
allocating formal stage-1 decision rights, we are back in the case of con-
tractible control: indeed, by informing A beforehand, P can credibly grant
real authority through the (possibly message-contingent) allocation of for-
mal stage-1 decision rights. As in section 3, P may then find it optimal
to first provide A with the relevant information and, second, offer formal
control to A with positive probability when reporting a bad type.
• if instead the relevant information about C and N cannot be understood by
A until after he has already been allocated formal authority over stage 1,
then the logic of transferable control applies again. Contractually allocating
formal authority to A is indeed no longer a credible way to grant him real
authority. However, once formal authority has been allocated to A, P can
also grant him real authority by providing the relevant information. The
analysis is then essentially the same as in the beginning of this section,
where A was always endowed with formal stage-1 control.
6.2 The scope of delegation
In the previous subsection, we identified circumstances under which P informs A
about both actions C and N , in order to let him reveal his willingness to cooper-
ate. In contrast, in AT, no such dynamic consideration exists and implementing
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one’s favorite project is the only thing that matters. As a result, transfers of
real authority never occur: when the party endowed with formal authority turns
to the other party for advice, it receives information about at most one project,
and therefore has no choice but to follow the recommendation. In our setup, P
finds it instead optimal to transfer real authority to A in stage 1 in order to learn
about his type, which is helpful for stage 2. We therefore have true delegation
here, motivated by the concern for future cooperation.
We can build on this insight to analyze the optimal scope or size of delegation.
To this end, we extend the action set to include convex combinations of actions
C and N . Specifically, for any α ∈ [0, 1], action Nα generates payoffs −αl for
the principal, 0 for a good agent and αB for a bad agent. P can now grant
partial control to A over any subset of actions Nα. In the AT interpretation, this
amounts to giving A the relevant information about these actions. An alternative
interpretation is that stage 1 consists of several projects, each of which involves
two actions N and C, with payoffs as described above. P then decides which
fraction of projects to delegate to A.
This convexification of the action set allows P to replicate the contractible
control optimum with only transferable control. Namely, it is optimal for P to
transfer control over the actions Nα for α ∈ [0, α¯], where α¯ = b/B represents
the minimal amount of delegation required for a bad A to reveal his type. The
extent of delegation thus increases with B and decreases with b: since the goal is
to induce a bad A to signal his type by choosing action N , it is easier, the higher
the short-term gain B of doing so, and the smaller the long-term loss b of doing
so.
This extension leads for example to intuitive comparative statics results:
• Suppose for example that, with exogenous probability ρ, the principal-agent
relationship disappears after stage 1, e.g., due to the technological ob-
solescence of the firm or of the agent’s firm-specific skills. Then b must
be replaced with (1− ρ) b and the optimal amount of delegation becomes
α¯ (ρ) = (1− ρ) b/B. Thus, delegation decreases with the rate of obsoles-
cence.
• Alternatively, one could assume that the benefit αB that the bad agent
obtains from action Nα now only arises if the agent receives an outside job
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offer. This would for example be the case if action N corresponds to an
investment in the agent’s general human capital or, more generally, in his
market value, at the expense of the firm. Call this probability ρ0. Now, the
optimal amount of delegation is defined by α = b/ (ρ0B). Thus, delegation
decreases with labor market mobility as measured by ρ0.
6.3 Further possible extensions
We have focused on a simple model with two periods, two types of agent and
two actions. Yet, we have allowed for a full-blown mechanism design approach,
in which the contracting set becomes particularly rich in the case with monetary
responsiveness. The main insights should generalize to the case of multiple types
and actions, but investigating optimal learning through control allocation in a
dynamic setting is an interesting avenue for further research.
The above discussion illustrates the potential for the notion of transferable
control to enrich the analysis of delegation in organizations in a dynamic context.
In particular, we have been able to rationalize transfers of real authority as a
learning device. This could be a useful building block for further investigating
the interaction between information flows, the design of hierarchies and trust-
building in organizations.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 4:
As in section 3, we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms where, at each
stage, A sends one of two messages — “good” and “bad”. We proceed again by
backward induction.
We first check that there is no scope for revelation of A’s type in stage 2.
Consider a candidate equilibrium where A reveals his type at stage 2, in which
case P implements the project only if A is good. In order for a bad A not to
pretend to be good, announcing a good type must involve an additional transfer
p in P ’s favor. Whatever the stage 1 action (C or N), a good A would find it
profitable to pay p (and have the project implemented) only if
g − p > 0,
and a bad A will not find it profitable to mimic a good type if
b− p < 0.
But these two conditions cannot be simultaneously satisfied when b > g.
Moving back one step, consider the control allocation stage. A can in prin-
ciple reveal his type by “acquiring control” at some specified price. More pre-
cisely, consider a separating equilibrium and let (xg, pg) and (xb, pb) denote the
agent’s probabilities of obtaining control and the payments in P ’s favor respec-
tively attached to reporting a good type and a bad type. In any such separating
equilibrium, when P keeps control of stage 1 she chooses C and then implements
the project only if A reported a good type. A bad A chooses N whenever in
control, and P then stops the project. Without loss of generality, a good A can
be assumed to choose C when in control,21 and P then implements the project.
The two participation constraints are thus:
g − pg ≥ 0
and:
xbB − pb ≥ 0.
21As before, requiring a good A to choose N is inefficient and gives a bad A additional
incentives to falsely report a good type.
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If a bad A falsely reports a good type, he reveals his type when in control (by
choosing N), in which case P then stops the project, and induces P to implement
the project when P keeps control. A bad A is thus willing to report the truth if:
xbB − pb ≥ (1− xg) b+ xgB − pg.
If a good A falsely announces a bad type, P chooses C when in control and
then stops the project. When A gets control, choosing N would again lead P to
stop the project; however, at this point A may try to “signal” his good type by
choosing C instead. Indeed, following the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, a choice
of action C can only be attributed to a good A, and must therefore be followed
by project implementation, irrespective of previous announcements. The good
A’s incentive constraint is then:22
g − pg ≥ xbg − pb.
The optimal contract leading to a separating equilibrium maximizes P ’s expected
payoff:
(1− µ) (pg +G) + µ [pb + (1− xb)× 0− xbl] ,
subject to the above constraints. Two things can be noted at this point. First,
giving control less often to a good type (reducing xg) relaxes the bad A’s incentive
constraint (since B > b) without affecting P ’s payoff, so that it is optimal for P to
set xg = 0. Second, since B ≥ b > g, the participation constraint of the bad A is
satisfied whenever his incentive constraint and the participation constraint of the
good A are. These two observations allow us to rewrite the relevant constraints
as:
g − pg ≥ 0,
g − pg ≥ xbg − pb,
and:
xbB − pb ≥ b− pg.
22Absent the Cho-Kreps criterion, P may refuse A’s signal and stick to the reported type,
which would reduce A’s benefit from falsely reporting a bad type. The analysis would be
similar, although P could then reduce the probability of control given to a bad type (from
(b− g)/(B − g) to (b− g)/B).
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The last condition must be binding, otherwise P could increase pb. Using this
condition to determine pb, P ’s expected payoff can be expressed as
pg + (1− µ)G− µ [xb (l −B) + b] ,
while the first two conditions become
pg ≤ g,
b− g ≤ xb (B − g) .
The optimal contract thus satisfies
pg = g, xb =
b− g
B − g ,
and the corresponding expected transfer pb is
pb = xbB − b+ pg =
b− g
B − gg = xbg,
which can be implemented by asking for a price g whenever control is allocated
to A.
This separating equilibrium yields 0 to a good A and xb(B − g) = b− g to a
bad A, while P obtains a payoff of:
(1− µ) (G+ g)− µ b− g
B − g (l − g)
which is positive provided:
µ ≤ µmc =
1
1 + b−g
B−g
l−g
G+g
.
This establishes the Proposition.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 5
It suffices to show that A’s payments and P ’s decisions cannot be message or
type-contingent. We first show that there is no scope for revelation of A’s type
at stage 2. If separation were to occur at that stage, a bad A would not pay
anything since an informed P would then stop the project. A good A could try
to credibly report his type by making a specific payment p, in order to induce
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P to implement the project. However, a good A would be willing to pay only
p ≤ g, and a bad A would then also report a good type since p < b.
We now show that there is no scope for messages at stage 1 either. In any
separating equilibrium, P would keep control and stop the project when a bad A
reveals his type. A bad A would thus not pay anything. A good A could try to
reveal his type by making a specific payment p in order to influence P ’s decision
over the allocation of stage 1 control. But again a good A would be willing to
pay p only if p ≤ g, in which case a bad A would pay p to obtain control and
choose action N , even if this leads P to stop the project. The lemma is proved.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 6
The previous lemma establishes that P cannot learn A’s type simply through
message-contingent payments and the reasoning is then similar to that of Section
4. If µ < µt, P prefers learning A’s type by transferring control over stage
1. A good A then obtains g (by choosing C and inducing P to implement the
project) and a bad A obtains B > g (it is a dominant strategy to choose N , even
though it then leads P to stop the project). The maximal price P can ask is thus
p = min(g,B) = g; a good A then gets no rent while a bad A gets B − g, and
P ’s expected payoff is
g + (1− µ)G− µl = (1− µ) (G+ g)− µ (l − g) ,
which is lower than when control is contractible.
If P opted instead for keeping control with probability 1, she would remain
uniformed about A’s type and implement the project only if µ < µ∗; in that case,
she could still require at most a price p = g, which is the maximal price a good
A is willing to pay. She would thus get (1− µ) (G+ g)−µ(L−g), which is lower
than what she can get with the above revelation mechanism. And if µ > µ∗,
P would stop the project and thus earn zero (since she could not ask for any
positive payment in that case). Therefore, P prefers the above mechanism to
keeping control with probability 1.
If µ > µt, P prefers keeping control and stopping the project; anticipating
this, A does not pay anything.
This completes the proof.
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